Regular as Ordens
Também na Inglaterra se fala das ordens profissionais.
Na Economist (link premium) de fim de ano (tenho a leitura atrasada...) encontrei um artigo sobre como vai o assunto por terras de Sua Majestade. Chamo a atenção para a comparação que se faz com as guildas medievais. Os destaques são meus.
"Law is certainly an odd industry, and its practitioners would like to keep it that way. Collectively, they regulate entry to the trade and can prevent non-lawyers even from investing in the business. They concoct elaborate rules (barristers are not allowed to tout their success rates, for example) and enforce them. Outfits like the Bar Council and the Law Society, which represents solicitors, hear complaints against their own members while also defending the profession against criticism. They might not run almshouses or put on mystery plays, but in other ways they carry on much like medieval guilds. "
"(...)these peculiarities do not make the law into something grander than a business; they just make it a badly run, anti-competitive business."
"Rule-makers need to be separated from advocates for the profession. Complaints must be heard by an independent body. Lawyers should be free to set up shop both with outside investors and with other species of lawyer, so that barristers could form partnerships with solicitors, for example. To manage change, and to ensure that lawyers do not find new ways to restrict competition, a Legal Services Board should be set up."
"Allowing doctors and lawyers to look after their own, albeit with some oversight, has advantages. The main one is that they know their stuff: educating outsiders to a level sufficient to second-guess the experts would take lots of time and money. There is also a kind of consensus that comes from self-interest. If a group of like-minded people develop and enforce their own rules, they are likely to believe in them, which means they will keep them in mind even when the door is closed.
The problem is that these outfits are, in effect, monopolies. Barristers cannot opt out of Bar Council control and choose another regulator instead. Because there is no competition, there is little incentive to drive up standards other than the desire to escape further interference from government. And codes of conduct are always liable to morph into trade-union rulebooks."
Na Economist (link premium) de fim de ano (tenho a leitura atrasada...) encontrei um artigo sobre como vai o assunto por terras de Sua Majestade. Chamo a atenção para a comparação que se faz com as guildas medievais. Os destaques são meus.
"Law is certainly an odd industry, and its practitioners would like to keep it that way. Collectively, they regulate entry to the trade and can prevent non-lawyers even from investing in the business. They concoct elaborate rules (barristers are not allowed to tout their success rates, for example) and enforce them. Outfits like the Bar Council and the Law Society, which represents solicitors, hear complaints against their own members while also defending the profession against criticism. They might not run almshouses or put on mystery plays, but in other ways they carry on much like medieval guilds. "
"(...)these peculiarities do not make the law into something grander than a business; they just make it a badly run, anti-competitive business."
"Rule-makers need to be separated from advocates for the profession. Complaints must be heard by an independent body. Lawyers should be free to set up shop both with outside investors and with other species of lawyer, so that barristers could form partnerships with solicitors, for example. To manage change, and to ensure that lawyers do not find new ways to restrict competition, a Legal Services Board should be set up."
"Allowing doctors and lawyers to look after their own, albeit with some oversight, has advantages. The main one is that they know their stuff: educating outsiders to a level sufficient to second-guess the experts would take lots of time and money. There is also a kind of consensus that comes from self-interest. If a group of like-minded people develop and enforce their own rules, they are likely to believe in them, which means they will keep them in mind even when the door is closed.
The problem is that these outfits are, in effect, monopolies. Barristers cannot opt out of Bar Council control and choose another regulator instead. Because there is no competition, there is little incentive to drive up standards other than the desire to escape further interference from government. And codes of conduct are always liable to morph into trade-union rulebooks."
