Obama’s Ersatz Capitalism
O mundo suspenso da cimeira da G20 e esta, por sua vez, suspensa do plano Obama. Um plano que Krugman vê como mera reciclagem dos planos da Administração Bush.
Nada de novo, portanto, no domínio do combate à crise, o que não nos impede de reconhecer serem os esforços dos líderes americanos muito mais arrojados do que os dos europeus, que parecem não perceber que há mundo para além das finanças públicas; que parecem não entender a real de dimensão desta crise. Que importa ter as finanças públicas em ordem se a economia real entrar em colapso?
Voltando ao Plano Obama, ele é aqui alvo de fortes críticas, por parte de Joseph E. Stiglitz:
THE Obama administration’s $500 billion or more proposal to deal with America’s ailing banks has been described by some in the financial markets as a win-win-win proposal. Actually, it is a win-win-lose proposal: the banks win, investors win — and taxpayers lose.
[...]
Consider an asset that has a 50-50 chance of being worth either zero or $200 in a year’s time. The average “value” of the asset is $100. Ignoring interest, this is what the asset would sell for in a competitive market. It is what the asset is “worth.” Under the plan by Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, the government would provide about 92 percent of the money to buy the asset but would stand to receive only 50 percent of any gains, and would absorb almost all of the losses. Some partnership!
Assume that one of the public-private partnerships the Treasury has promised to create is willing to pay $150 for the asset. That’s 50 percent more than its true value, and the bank is more than happy to sell. So the private partner puts up $12, and the government supplies the rest — $12 in “equity” plus $126 in the form of a guaranteed loan.
If, in a year’s time, it turns out that the true value of the asset is zero, the private partner loses the $12, and the government loses $138. If the true value is $200, the government and the private partner split the $74 that’s left over after paying back the $126 loan. In that rosy scenario, the private partner more than triples his $12 investment. But the taxpayer, having risked $138, gains a mere $37.
P.S. Título retirado do artigo do New York Times
Nada de novo, portanto, no domínio do combate à crise, o que não nos impede de reconhecer serem os esforços dos líderes americanos muito mais arrojados do que os dos europeus, que parecem não perceber que há mundo para além das finanças públicas; que parecem não entender a real de dimensão desta crise. Que importa ter as finanças públicas em ordem se a economia real entrar em colapso?
Voltando ao Plano Obama, ele é aqui alvo de fortes críticas, por parte de Joseph E. Stiglitz:
THE Obama administration’s $500 billion or more proposal to deal with America’s ailing banks has been described by some in the financial markets as a win-win-win proposal. Actually, it is a win-win-lose proposal: the banks win, investors win — and taxpayers lose.
[...]
Consider an asset that has a 50-50 chance of being worth either zero or $200 in a year’s time. The average “value” of the asset is $100. Ignoring interest, this is what the asset would sell for in a competitive market. It is what the asset is “worth.” Under the plan by Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, the government would provide about 92 percent of the money to buy the asset but would stand to receive only 50 percent of any gains, and would absorb almost all of the losses. Some partnership!
Assume that one of the public-private partnerships the Treasury has promised to create is willing to pay $150 for the asset. That’s 50 percent more than its true value, and the bank is more than happy to sell. So the private partner puts up $12, and the government supplies the rest — $12 in “equity” plus $126 in the form of a guaranteed loan.
If, in a year’s time, it turns out that the true value of the asset is zero, the private partner loses the $12, and the government loses $138. If the true value is $200, the government and the private partner split the $74 that’s left over after paying back the $126 loan. In that rosy scenario, the private partner more than triples his $12 investment. But the taxpayer, having risked $138, gains a mere $37.
P.S. Título retirado do artigo do New York Times
